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TOWARDS "GENERALIZED CONTROL THEORY"* 
by 
Y. C .  Ho 
A f a v o r i t e  guessing game popular among symposia, meetings, a f t e r -  
dinner  conversations i n  con t ro l - theo re t i c  circles i n  recent  days seems 
t o  be the  quest ion "What Next?". 
growing mathematical r e s p e c t i b i l i t y  of t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  on one hand and 
t h e  va r ious  "success s t o r i e s ' '  i n  p r a c t i c e  on t h e  o t h e r .  
an at tempt  w i l l  be made i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a framework wi th in  which such 
a quest ion might be asked and answered.f 
informal and specu la t ive .  
This is appropr i a t e  i n  view of t h e  
I n  t h i s  note ,  
The discussion w i l l  be  
It seems t o  the  author  t h a t  t h e r e  are t h r e e  main ing red ien t s  i n  
an opt imizat ion problem, whether s t a t i c  o r  dynamic. They are: the  
c r i t e r i o n  func t ion ,  t he  c o n t r o l l e r ,  and the  information a v a i l a b l e  t o  
t h e  c o n t r o l l e r .  For t r a d i t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  theory,  a l l  the  ing red ien t s  
are s i n g u l a r  i n  the sense t h a t  t h e r e  is only one c r i t e r i o n ,  one central 
c o n t r o l l e r  coordinat ing a l l  c o n t r o l  a c t i o n s ,  and one information set 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r .  Within t h i s  s e tup ,  some very general  
and deep s ta tements  can and have been made f o r  t h e  problem. On the  
o the r  hand, one can a l s o  argue t h a t  t h i s  viewpoint is unnecessar i ly  
narrow. Surely,  w e  can a l l  v i s u a l i z e  s i t u a t i o n s  o r  problems i n  which 
the re  are more than one performance measure, more than one i n t e l l i g e n t  
c o n t r o l l e r  operat ing with o r  without coordinat ion from o t h e r s ,  and - 
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-1.1 have d e l i b e r a t e l y  avoided t h e  inc lus ion  here  of r e l a t e d  bu t  never- 
t h e l e s s  important s u b j e c t s  such as,  mathematical system theory,  
s t a b i l i t y  theory,  model theory,  e tc .  where opt imizat ion is not  t h e  
main concern. 
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f i n a l l y  a l l  the  c o n t r o l l e r s  may o r  may not  have t h e  Same information 
set  a v a i l a b l e  t o  them. a start ,  we can d iv ide  each of t he  
ing red ien t s  i n t o  t h r e e  subca tegor ies .  
(i) one J (ii) two J’s with J1 - -J2 and ( i i i )  mu l t ip l e  J ’ s  with  
Ji i= l , . . . , n .  For t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  C, w e  hove ( i )  one C ,  ( i i )  two 
C I S  and (iii) mul t ip l e  C’s. 
t h e  cases  (i) one p e r f e c t  information set  ( i i )  one noisy (or im- 
For the  c r i t e r i o n  J, we have 
F i n a l l y  f o r  t he  information set, we have 
t , ; c ) .4 )  information set and (iii) mul t ip l e  information set e 
s u b c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ,  t he  fol lowing t a b l e  of organiza t ion  is s e l f -  
With these  
explanatory.  
With t he  except ion of t h e  f i r s t  t w o  ca t egor i e s ,  I have given some 
references  containing r ep resen ta t ive  works where in t roductory  materials, 
r e s u l t s ,  and examples of a p p l i c a t i o n  may be found. One a l s o  no te s  
t h a t  i n  t h i s  framework, t he  names a t tached  t o  these  ca t egor i e s  appear 
inadequate but entrenched For example, a more d e s c r i p t i v e  t i t l e  f o r  
(3) is “2C/2J/lZ problem i n  genera l ized  con t ro l  theory.”  However, 
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one can hardly expect such a terminology to take hold at this stage. 
Except for the fir 
categories are available only for the static optimization case. Even 
there many basic concepts are subtle and difficult, e.g. the coalition 
problems in (6) and the definition of equilibrium solution of (8). 
Suffice is to paraphrase a famous remark: "they will not be solved 
in the first thousand days e e a but let us begin". 
Y. C. Ho 
Haward University 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
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